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THE CASE OF YO UNG, JAMES, AND WEBSTER:
BRITISH LABOR LAW AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guarantees all individuals
within the jurisdiction of the signatory states the right to freedom of
association, including the right to form and join trade unions.' Arti-
cle 13 of the Convention requires that any individual whose Conven-
tion rights have been violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority.2 The United Kingdom is one of the signatories
to the Convention; British law allows "closed shop ' 3 agreements
between trade unions and management.4 There has been considera-
ble controversy as to whether Article .11 prohibits such closed shop
agreements because of the restrictions that those agreements place
on the freedom of an individual not to associate.5 In addition, there
I. Article 11 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for
the protection of his interests.
(2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the
police or of the administration of the State.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS, 5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS].
2. Article 13 provides:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 5.
3. A closed shop is "the term customarily applied to an agreement or arrangement
which requires employees to join a specified union as a condition of getting or holding a
job." GREEN PAPER ON TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, 66 on file at Cornell Int'l L.J. [here-
inafter cited as GREEN PAPER]. For a more detailed description of the closed shop see 0.
KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW, 193-209 (2d ed. 1977).
4. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Industrial
Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72 § 5; see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52 § 6(5), sched. 1; and see
infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Employment Act, 1980,
ch. 42, § 7.
5. 4 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 262 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES].
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is a potential for conflict between British law and Article 13, because
Parliament never incorporated the Convention into domestic law.6
Consequently, British citizens may not have a national forum in
which to vindicate effectively their convention rights.7
In the Case of Young, James, and Webster,8 three British labor-
ers asked the European Court of Human Rights to consider the
issues of freedom of association and the right to an effective remedy.
Young, James, and Webster objected to union membership on per-
sonal and political grounds.9 British law on unfair dismissal, how-
ever, allowed an employee to refuse union membership only on the
basis of religious beliefs.10 Therefore, the three were dismissed from
their jobs with British Railways for refusing to join a union. Because
British law sanctioned their dismissals, they sought relief from the
European Court of Human Rights.
The determination of the European Court in Young, James, and
Webster raises several questions regarding the effectiveness of the
European Convention when it is implicated in a situation similar to
the one presented by the British closed shop system. This Note
examines those questions. Section I presents an overview of the pro-
cedures available for implementing Convention rights. This Note
then uses the Young, James, and Webster case as the basis for an
analysis of Articles 11 and 13. Section II examines the British law on
unfair dismissals and closed shops in the context of the freedom of
association provision of the European Convention. Section III sum-
6. In Britain, only the crown can conclude a treaty. E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRAD-
LEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 276-77 (8th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WADE AND PHIL-
LIPS]. The crown, however, is not competent to enact or modify legislation. Thus,
Parliament must enact any treaty that is to have the force of municipal law. Id If the
"execution and application in the United Kingdom" of a treaty involves a change in
British law, Parliament must enact the appropriate legislation. Id at 278. Britain never
enacted the Convention. The government in power at the time of ratification assumed
that existing domestic law was in accord with the provisions of the Convention.
Drzemczewski, The Implementation ofthe United Kingdom's Obligations Under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights: Recent Developments, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 95, 98
(1979). Successive governments have taken the same position. Id
7. WADE AND PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 266-67. For a general discussion of the
effects of the European Convention on Human Rights on the domestic law of the signa-
tory states, and in particular that of the United Kingdom, see generally Drzemczewski,
The Authority ofthe Findings ofthe Organs ofthe European Human Rights Convention in
Domestic Courts, 1979 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1; Drzemczewski,
supra note 6. See also infra note 133 and accompanying text.
8. Case of Young, James, and Webster (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights) (Judgment of 13
Aug. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Young, James, and Webster]. Young, James, and Web-
ster applied initially to the European Commission on Human Rights. The Commission
recommended the case to the Court. For a discussion of the procedures involved in
appearing before the Court see infra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
9. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 11-13.
10. Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976, ch. 7, § l(e). See
infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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marizes the applicability of the Convention to British domestic law,
and discusses the conflict that exists between British law and Article
13. Finally, section IV proposes changes both in British law and the
Convention which might give greater effect to the Convention in the
United Kingdom as well as in other Convention signatories.
I. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE CLOSED SHOP CASE
A. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
OVERVIEW
A primary purpose of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is to protect the human
rights of all individuals in the signatory states. The promulgation of
the Convention, to some extent, was a consequence of the European
integration movement that followed the Second World War." Sev-
enteen members of the Council of Europe' 2 signed the Convention
in Rome on November 4, 1950.13 The Convention incorporates
many of the principles and provisions of The Universal Declaration
on Human Rights. 14 The Convention prescribes civil and political
rights which the "High Contracting Parties" must afford to individu-
11. Consequently, citizens may bring a petition against their own state to the Euro-
pean Commission. See F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1-
7 (1975). Professor Jacobs maintains that, in the wake of the Second World War, the
formation of the Council of Europe and the drafting of the Convention were the most
significant immediate results of the movement for European unity. Jacobs explains that
the creation of the Council of Europe and the adoption of the Human Rights Convention
are an acknowledgment that the civil liberties of individuals may require protection from
the state of which he or she is a national. The establishment of the Convention and its
organs of enforcement as an independent body of international law initiated a new
approach to the protection of human rights. Traditionally, the protection of human
rights had been relegated to the domestic jurisdiction of the individuals states. For fur-
ther history of the Convention, see also A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 1-
21 (2d ed. 1977); G. WEIL, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21-35
(1963); Robertson, The Political Background and Historical Development of the European
Convention on Human Rights in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 24
(1965).
12. The Council of Europe is a product of the movement for European unity that
emerged after the Second World War, and was formed to bring together the European
nations in the post-war reconstruction effort. COUNCIL OF EUROPE SECRETARIAT, MAN-
UAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 3-5 (1970). The Council was created by the Statute of
the Council of Europe in 1949, and had the stated objective of achieving "a greater unity
between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and princi-
ples which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social pro-
gress." The Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. l(a) reprinted in MANUAL
OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE, app. 1, at 299. Any European state may be invited to become a
member. Id art. 4, app. 1, at 300. The Council is composed of a Committee of Ministers
and a Consultative Assembly. Id art. 10, app. 1, at 301.
13. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1 at 17.
14. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 74 (1948) (3d Sess., 1st Part).
1982]
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als within their jurisdictions, and establishes mechanisms to protect
those rights.
The European Convention established two judicial bodies for
protecting human rights: the European Commission on Human
Rights (Commission) and the European Court of Human Rights
(Court).15 Petitions alleging violations of Convention rights may be
referred to the Commission by a High Contracting Party, 16 or by
"any person, non-governmental organisation, or group of individu-
als."' 7 The Commission, however, does not accept jurisdiction until
the applicant exhausts all domestic remedies.' 8 Furthermore, the
Commission does not accept anonymously submitted petitions, and
it will not resolve matters "already [dealt with] by the Commission,"
15. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 19 at 7.
All members of the Council of Europe are guaranteed judicial representation on the
Court. Id art. 38 at 11. The number of members on the Commission, however, is con-
trolled by the number of signatories to the Convention. Id art. 20 at 7. Presently, there
are 21 members of the Court and 20 members of the Commission. The judges on the
Court are nominated by the Council of Europe and elected by its Consultative Assembly
for a nine-year term. Id arts. 39, 40 at 11-12. Commission members serve six-year
terms. Id art. 22 at 8.
In addition, the Statute of the Council of Europe provides for a Committee of Minis-
ters, see supra note 12, at art. 14, which functions as the executive organ for the Conven-
tion. Under Article 32 of the Convention, CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS supra note I, at 10,
the Committee decides whether the Convention has been violated in those cases that the
Commission does not refer to the Court. Id at 13. For a general discussion of the prin-
cipal mechanisms for enforcing the Convention, see F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 14-20 (1974); Golsong, The Control Machinery of the
European Convention on Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS supra note 11, at 38.
16. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 24 at 8. This provision applies
when there is a breach of a Convention right by another High Contracting Party. A High
Contracting Party denotes a signatory State of the Convention.
17. Id art. 25 at 8-9. Article 25 is concerned with the actions of a High Contracting
Party which violate an individual's Convention rights. Article 25 includes a provision
stating that the Commission will only receive individual petitions if the government
against which the complaint was filed "has declared that it recognises the competence of
the Commission to receive such petitions." Id at 9. Declarations may be made for spe-
cific time periods, and are to be sent to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe,
who transmits copies to the signatory governments. In 1966 the United Kingdom issued
a declaration, effective for three years, recognizing the right of individual petition. [1966]
Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8. The United Kingdom renewed this declaration
in 1974 for two years, and in 1976 for five years. [1976] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 6, 14. The United Kingdom most recently renewed its declaration in January of
1981. See 994 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 90 (1980). Professor Fawcett finds the right of
individual petition remarkable because it allows the individual to "bring an application
against any contracting state." Thus, the individual is not dependent upon the diplo-
matic intervention of a state "for the protection of Convention rights." J.E.S. FAWCETT,
THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 279 (1969).
18. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, arts. 26, 27(3) at 9. Article 26 provides
that the standards for determining whether domestic remedies have been exhausted are
the "generally recognized rules of international law." Id art. 26 at 9. For a general
discussion of the law of exhaustion of local remedies and Article 26, see F. CASTBERG,
supra note 15, at 40; J.E.S. FAWCETT, supra note 17, at 288; A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note
11, at 160-65; and G. WEIL, supra note 11, at 104.
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or matters which are incompatible with the provisions of the present
Convention."' 19 Finally, the Commission will not consider a case
that is manifestly illfounded, or that abuses the right of petition.20
When a dispute arises under the Convention, the Commission
initially attempts to bring the parties to a "friendly settlement." 21 If
a settlement is not forthcoming, the Commission forwards a report
embodying its recommendations to the Committee of Ministers.22
Then the Commission may refer the case to the Court,23 and the
Court will issue a decision. If the case is not referred to the Court,
the Committee of Ministers decides the case. In either case, the deci-
sion binds the High Contracting Party.24
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
extends "to all cases concerning the interpretation and application ' 25
of the Convention which either the High Contracting Parties or the
19. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 27 at 9.
20. Id Upon receiving a petition, the Commission first must decide whether an
application is admissible under Article 27. Professor Fawcett claims this screening pro-
cess is the one part of the Commission's activities that can be labelled quasi-judicial.
J.E.S. FAWCETT, supra note 17, at 3 10. Even after accepting a petition, the Commission
may reject a petition if, during its examination, the Commission finds that one of the
grounds for non-acceptance provided for in Article 27 exists. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 1, art. 29 at 10.
From 1955 to 1980, out of a total of 8,693 decisions (9,216 applications registered), the
Commission declared 234 admissible (approximately 2.6%). EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REviEw 1980,40 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REviEw
1980].
21. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, arts. 28(b), 30 at 9-10. Article 28(b)
provides that the Commission should "place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned
with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for
Human Rights as defined in this Convention." The Commission accomplishes this goal
through confidential negotiations with the parties. F. JACOBS, supra note 11, at 254.
Usually the Commission will indicate to the government involved its "provisional opin-
ion on the question of a violation." Id at 255. Because a formal finding may necessitate
compensating the victim and making any requisite changes in the law, it is in the interest
of the government to achieve a mutually beneficial settlement with the applicant if the
Commission believes a violation exists. Id If the parties do not reach a settlement, the
Commission decides the case by majority vote. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1,
art. 34, at 11.
22. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 31 at 10.
23. I. art. 48 at 13. Robertson cites several factors that influence the decision of the
Commission regarding whether or not to bring a case before the Court. A.H. ROBERT-
SON, supra note 11, at 205-06. If the substance of the case poses difficult legal problems
that the Court is better suited than the Committee of Ministers to decide, or if a case
requires authoritative interpretation of a Convention provision, the Commission is apt to
refer the issue to the Court. Id at 205. A narrow division of the Commission members
over a question also may prompt referral to the Court. Id at 205-06. If the case involves
serious political questions, the Commission probably will refer the case to the Committee
of Ministers, because the Committee, as the executive organ of the Council of Europe, is
more political in nature than the Court. Id at 206.
24. A two-thirds vote is required. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 32 at
10. Article 32 provides a three-month period for further efforts towards a friendly settle-
ment. Id See also id art. 47 at 13.
25. Id art. 45 at 12.
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Commission 26 refer to the Court.27 A chamber of judges decides
each case.28 The judgements of the Court are final,29 and the signa-
tory states, when parties to a case, must abide by the decisions of the
Court.30
B. THE CASE OF YOUNG, JAMES, AND WEBSTER
The Case of Young, James, and Webster 3' arose in 1975 when
British Railways dismissed Ian Young, Noel James, and Ronald
Webster from their jobs. The dismissals of the employees resulted
from their refusal to join one of the three unions that had signed
closed shop agreements with British Rail.3 2 Notices posted at the
work sites informed the employees that closed shop agreements
between certain unions and British Rail modified the employment
contracts of all railroad employees. After the modification, member-
ship in one of these-unions became a condition of employment. 33
Young and Webster were told that the unfair dismissal provisions of
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 197434 exempted them
26. Id arts. 44, 48 at 12-13. Under Article 48(a) the Commission brings cases before
the Court for individuals whose rights have been violated.
27. Id art. 45 at 12. The Court decides questions concerning its own jurisdiction.
id art. 49 at 13. States may declare, however, that they recognize the Court's jurisdic-
tion as compulsory. Id art. 46 at 13.
28. Id art. 43 at 12. For each case, seven judges are selected to make up the Cham-
ber, a judge from the state or states concerned in the case sits as an ex officio member.
Under Article 48 of the Court's rules, however, the Chamber may relinquish jurisdiction
in favor of the plenary Court. Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights,
reprintedin COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (1971). The Court
resorted to this procedure in Young, James, and Webster.
29. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 52 at 14. See id art. 51, which
provides that the Court must give reasons for its judgments.
30. Id art. 53 at 14.
3 1. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8.
32. The unions involved were the National Union of Railwaymen (N.U.R.), the
Transport and Salaried Staff Association (T.S.S.A.), and the Associated Society of Loco-
motive Engineers and Firemen (A.S.L.E.F.). The agreement was made in July, 1975.
Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 8.
33. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 8-9. Young was hired in 1972, James
in 1974, and Webster in 1958. Webster had objected to joining a union in 1970 under
similar circumstances, but because in 1971 Parliament enacted the Industrial Relations
Act, which outlawed dismissals based on the refusal of an employee to join a union in a
closed shop, his objection did not result in his dismissal.
34. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 6(5), sched. 1. See infra,
notes 78-84 and accompanying text. The Act provided:
(5) Dismissal of an employee by an employer shall be regarded as fair for the
purposes of this Schedule if-
(a) it is the practice, in accordance with a union membership agreement,
for all employees of that employer or all employees of the same class as the
dismissed employee to belong to a specified independent trade union, or to
one of a number of specified independent trade unions; and
(b) the reason for the dismissal was that the employee was not a member
of the specified union or one of the specified unions, or had refused or pro-
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from forced union membership if they genuinely objected to becom-
ing members of any union because of religious beliefs, or due to any
other reasonable grounds. 35 The fired employees asserted their
exempt status, and an appeal body36 convened, in accordance with
the union membership agreement, to hear their claims. Before the
hearing, however, Parliament passed the Trade Union and Labour
Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976.37 The 1976 Act repealed the pro-
vision of the 1974 Act which allowed exemptions from union mem-
bership on "any reasonable grounds. '' 38 Because the claims of
Young and Webster were not based on the ground of religious belief,
their claims were denied.39 James refused to join the required union
for a different reason; he was dissatisfied with the way in which the
union responded to the salary clarification request of a fellow
employee.40 British Rail therefore dismissed him for failing to com-
posed to refuse to become or remain a member of that union or one of those
unions;
unless the employee genuinely objects on the grounds of religious belief to being
a member of any trade union whatsoever, or on any reasonable grounds to being
a member of a particular trade union, in which case the dismissal shall be
regarded as unfair.
35. Applications 7601/76 and 7806/77, Young, James, and Webster v. United King-
dom, Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Comm'n Report].
36. The Appeal Body was established by the union membership agreement and con-
sisted of representatives from British Rail, the T.S.S.A., and the N.U.R. Comm'n Report,
supra note 35, at 9, 12.
37. Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976, ch. 7.
38. Id § l(e).
39. Young and Webster's claims of exemption were based on a variety of political
considerations. Young, for instance, protested in writing that he did not agree with the
union's political bias towards the Labour Party. Comm'n Report, supra note 35, at 8-9.
He also indicated that he did not want to provide financial support for the Labour Party,
or have money from the union fund support a Labour party oriented newspaper. Id In
Young's opinion, the union was responsible for increased inflation. Id In addition, he
complained that the union, was "intolerant of the expression of individual freedom." Id
He also claimed that closed shops would permit the union to have more control over
employees, and that union strikes would require that he leave work, even though he
considered striking a form of collective blackmail. Id Finally, Young noted that if he
ever wished to become a full time union official, he would have to give the union records
of his past activities with the Labour and Trade Union movements. Id Webster's claims
were similar. He opposed closed shops because of their porported effects on individual
rights and the economy, and believed that trade unions failed to provide adequate repre-
sentation for employees. Id at 83-84. Finally, Webster also believed that the union's
influence was not in the best interest of the country. Id
40. James initially had no objection to joining the union he was required to join, the
N.U.R. As a result of a wage dispute in which he and another worker were involved,
however, James did not apply for N.U.R. membership. The other worker, already a
N.U.R. member, had applied to the union for clarification of his salary calculation.
James was not satisfied with the failure of the union to state the basis for concluding that
his fellow employee's salary was computed correctly. Neither the union nor the manage-
ment responded to James' inquiry concerning his own salary; he refused, therefore, to
join the union.
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ply with the union membership agreement.41
The three former railroad employees applied to the European
Commission on Human Rights, which referred the case to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. 42 In the Court proceedings, the appli-
cants alleged that the United Kingdom had violated several of their
Convention rights, including their freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion, guaranteed by Article 9;43 their freedom of expressioh,
protected by Article 10;44 their freedom of association, including the
right to form and join trade unions, articulated in Article 11; 4-5 and
their right to an effective remedy before a national authority, granted
41. James brought a claim before an Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed
his claim on the grounds that James had not followed the exemption procedure outlined
in the agreement. Furthermore, he had not claimed that his grounds for refusing to join
the union were religious; therefore, under the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Amendment), Act 1976, ch. 7 § 1(e), the dismissal was fair. Comm'n Report, supra note
35, at 9-10.
42. Young and James joined in filing an application before the Commission. Web-
ster filed separately. The Commission joined their actions on May 11, 1978, after holding
hearings on both the admissibility and the merits of the individual applications. Comm'n
Report, supra note 35, at 4. The Commission was unable to bring the parties to a friendly
settlement under Article 31(2) of the Convention. Id at 5. The Commission did not find
it necessary to consider whether the freedom of association protected by Article 11 of the
Convention included the right not to join any trade union. Id at 32. It did find, how-
ever, that the applicants' Article 11 rights were violated. .1d at 37. It explained that the
freedom to join trade unions includes the right to join a union of one's own choice, and if
no such union is available, to form a labor association by "private initiative." Id at 34.
It observed that the applicants were dismissed for refusing to join a specific trade union
against their "personal convictions." Id at 35. Furthermore, Young, James, and Web-
ster were already employed by British Rail when the closed shop agreement became
effective; thus, the consequence of failing to join a union was loss of employment. The
Commission distinguished this situation from the situation in which a closed shop
arrangement existed before a worker was hired, because in the latter situation the Com-
mission discerned elements of consent. Id
The Commission found that, with respect to Article 13, there is no right to a remedy
when legislation is in conflict with the Convention because "[s]uch a remedy would...
amount to some sort ofjudicial review of legislation." Id at 38. The Commission found
that Article 13 is concerned with individuals acting in an official capacity, rather than
with legislation.
43. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 9 at 5; see Comm'n Report, supra
note 35, at 13-14.
44. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note I, art. 10 at 5-6; see Comm'n Report, supra
note 35, at 15.
45. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 11 at 6; Comm'n Report, supra note
35, at 15-30. For the text of article 11, see supra note 1. The applicants claimed that
under the ordinary meaning of the language of Article 1 (1), "the right to associate and
the right not to associate were two sides of the same coin, the freedom to associate."
Comm'n Report, supra note 35, at 15. They alleged that the right to join trade unions was
useless if they could only join unions recognized by their employers, or risk dismissal.
Id at 16. The applicants stressed that it was "a power to exact. . . a choice [not to
associate]," not the actual dismissal, which violated the Convention. Id at 18. The
applicants agreed with the government that there was no difference between refusing to
hire someone who would not join a union and dismissing a non-union employee. Both
actions, the applicants claimed, were equally unfair. The latter situation, however,
involved an additional problem as the union agreement changed the terms of the
employee's contract without the employee's participation or consent. Id
CASE OF YOUNG, JAMES, AND WEBSTER
by Article 13.46
The Court held that the United Kingdom had violated Article
11 by compelling Young, James, and Webster either to join a union,
or to risk dismissal and the concomitant loss of livelihood. The
Court stated that "a threat of dismissal involving loss of livelihood is
a most serious form of compulsion. ' 47 This type of coercion, the
Court noted, struck at the essence of an individual's right to freedom
of association. 48 The Court emphasized that the threat was directed
against workers that were hired before British Rail entered the close
shop agreement.49  The fact that the agreement limited the
employee's choice regarding which union to join, and thereby fur-
ther impinged upon the individual's freedom to associate, was also a
consideration.50
Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of whether Article
The government contended that it did not make union membership agreements com-
pulsory; it simply left the matter up to the employers and the unions. Furthermore, the
government did not alter the rights of employees when an employer, in breach of a con-
tract, unfairly dismissed an employee. The government also asserted that there could be
no right not to associate, for if an employee claimed such a right in a closed shop, he or
she would deny other workers the right not to associate with those who refused to work
under the same terms and conditions as themselves. "The right of 'non-association'
could not exist for one employee and not for all the employees." d at 20. In addition,
the government denied that any compulsion was involved in the dismissal of the
employee. Employees simply were faced with the choice ofjoining a union or not work-
ing for one particular employer. Id Because the Convention did not establish a right to
work, there could be no violation of Article 11(1). Finally, the government distinguished
the right to join trade unions frpm the freedom to associate, saying that the right was not
absolute but could be qualified by certain terms. Therefore, even if the Convention
established a right not to join a trade union, the right was qualified; an individual could
"only refuse to join if he accepted that he could not enjoy the benefits." Id. at 22.
46. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 13 at 6; Comm'n Report, supra note
35, at 31. For the text of Article 13 see supra note 2. The applicants claimed that the
United Kingdom had an "obligation under international law to ensure that domestic law
was in line with treaty obligations." Comm'n Report, supra note 35, at 31. The British
government claimed that an Article 13 issue could arise only if the applicants first
demonstrated that a Convention right had been violated. Id Because the government
had not violated any of the applicants' Convention rights, the government claimed the
Article 13 issue was moot. Id
47. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 18. The Article 9 and 10 issues were
not considered in detail by either the Commission or the Court because they turned on
the determination of the Article 11 claim. The Court said:
The protection of personal opinion afforded by Articles 9 and 10 in the shape of
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and of freedom of expression is also
one of the purposes of freedom of association as guaranteed by Article 11.
Accordingly, it strikes at the very substance of this Article to exert pressure, of
the kind applied to the applicants, in order to compel someone to join an associa-
tion contrary to his convictions.
Id at 19.
48. Id at 18.
49. See id at 19.
50. See id at 18.
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11(2)51 justified the actions of the United Kingdom in interfering
with human rights. It focused this part of its analysis on the follow-
ing question: "[I]n order to achieve the aims of the unions party to
the 1975 agreement with British Rail, was it 'necessary in a demo-
cratic society,' to make lawful the dismissal of the applicants?" 52
The Court noted that the dismissal of the employees was not neces-
sary in this case because the unions involved already had extensive
membership listings.53 In addition, the Court observed that unions
that establish closed shop agreements with employers frequently per-
mit employees hired prior to the existence of the agreement to
abstain from joining any union.5 4
Most importantly, while finding a violation of the employees'
freedom to associate, the Court did not decide whether the Article 11
right to freedom of association included the right not to become a
member of any union or association.5 5 The Court also found it
unnecessary to consider whether there had been a violation of Arti-
cle 13,56 which guarantees individuals the right to an effective rem-
edy before a national authority.
The Court's decision is disappointing because it failed to
address two critical issues raised by the case: first, whether the free-
dom to associate includes the right not to associate, at least with
regard to union membership; and second, whether individuals, such
as Young, James, and Webster, can avail themselves of an effective
remedy before a national authority when the nation involved has not
incorporated the Convention into its domestic law. This Note main-
tains that the Court could have resolved these issues more ade-
quately by determining that Article 11 implies both a positive
freedom to associate and an equivalent negative freedom not to asso-
51. The Court raised the issue of Article 11(2) even though the United Kingdom
stated that if the Court found interference with a right guaranteed by paragraph one of
Articles 9, 10, or 11, it would not seek to argue that such interference was justified. Id at
19. For the text of Article 11(2) see supra note 1.
52. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 20.
53. Id at 20.
54. Id The Court considered three factors in determining whether the applicants'
dismissal met the definition of "necessary in a democratic society." First, it established
that "necessary" was not a flexible term, i.e., the necessity requirement of Article 11(2) is
not satisfied by mere advantageousness. Id at 20. Second, it noted that "pluralism, tol-
erance, and broadmindedness are the hallmarks of a 'democratic society.'" Id at 21.
Finally, the restrictions on Convention rights "must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued." Id (citing Handyside Case, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CoNV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
506 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights)).
55. The Court said that it was adhering to its policy of limiting its holding to the facts
at issue. Young, James, and Wesbster, supra note 8, at 17-18.
56. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note I, at 22. The Court stated that, "[h]aving
regard to its decision on Article 11 . . ., the Court does not consider it necessary to
determine whether there has in addition been a violation of Article 13." For a discussion
of Article 13 see infra notes 149-69 and accompanying text.
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ciate, and by at least addressing the Article 13 issue. This Note rec-
ognizes, however, that a decision by the Court holding that no
adequate national remedy existed would not by itself resolve the
most pressing Article 13 problem, namely, whether signatory states
should incorporate the Convention into their domestic law in order
to ensure an effective national remedy, may require an amendment
to Article 13. The following discussion of British unfair dismissal
law provides a background to the Case of Young, James, and Web-
ster. It also illustrates the type of controversial domestic human
rights issues that may require Convention guidance.
II. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND BRITISH LAW ON
UNFAIR DISMISSAL
A. UNFAIR DISMISSAL AND CLOSED SHOPS IN BRITISH LAW
Developments over the past decade in British law regarding
unfair dismissal demonstrate the inability of the legislature to con-
trol collectively bargained union membership agreements.5 7 Closed
shop agreements have been a persistent problem for the British gov-
ernment, even though no law protects collectively bargained agree-
ments, and such agreements are not enforceable as legal contracts.5 8
Since the late 1960's, the number of workers covered by closed
shop agreements has increased from 3.75 million to 5.2 million.59
Closed shop agreements now govern the employment contracts of
many white collar workers, and have become quite popular in many
57. The phrases "union membership agreement" and "closed shop" are used inter-
changeably in this Note. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 30
defines a union membership agreement as an arrangement that
has the effect of requiring the terms and conditions of employment of every
employee of that class to include a condition that he must be or become a mem-
ber of the union or one of the unions which is or are parties to the agreement or
arrangement or of another appropriate independent trade union.
58. Professor Kahn-Freund asserts that collective bargaining agreements lack the
status of enforceable contracts because the parties do not intend to conclude a binding
contract. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 3, at 125-26. He attributes this lack of intent to
the structure of British collective bargaining. Id at 127. The Industrial Relations Act,
1971, c. 72, § 34, attempted to make collective bargaining agreements binding, but unions
and employers avoided this provision by including disclaimers in their agreements. Id
at 130. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, c. 52, § 18, reversed the 1971
Act by creating a presumption similar to the one at common law, that collective bargain-
ing agreements were not binding unless the parties agreed to the contrary in writing. Id
at 131.
Professor Kahn-Freund also advances the thesis that collective bargaining agreements
in Britain, although not legally enforceable as contracts, operate as a sort of non-binding
"code" which serves certain social functions within labor relations. Freedom of contract
may be limited or restrained by collective agreements. Id at 133. The terms of the
collective agreement shape the terms of individual contracts.
59. The Times (London), Aug. 15, 1981 at 3, col. 3.
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developing industries. 60 There are several possible explanations for
the increasing popularity of closed shops. Some suggest that closed
shops permit the union to further the political aims of this otherwise
powerless membership. 61 Other commentators emphasize that
closed shop agreements assure adequate representation for all work-
ers, and increase stability in the collective bargaining process. 62 In
any event, the increase in closed shops has occurred despite the
efforts of several conservative governments to eliminate such
arrangements. 63
Before the 1970's, common law contract principles governed
unfair dismissal complaints, including those complaints that were
brought because employees were fired for refusing to join a union
when a closed shop was in effect.64 Under the common law, unfairly
dismissed employees were entitled only to reasonable notice of the
termination of their contracts.65 The failure of an employer to give
notice entitled the employee to contract damages, 66 consisting of the
60. The most pronounced growth has been in the food, drink and tobacco; clothing
and footwear, gas, water, and electricity; and transportation and communication sectors.
Id
61. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 3, at 199. Kahn-Freund asserts that "the case for
the closed shop can only be made in terms of the need for an equilibrium of power." Id
62. GREEN PAPER, supra note 3, at 66. Closed shop advocates also argue that non-
union members who withhold their support should not receive the benefits won by the
unions. Kahn-Freund rejects this argument. He concedes that it has emotional appeal,
but argues that the problem is easily solved by having non-union members make mone-
tary contributions to union funds, as is the practice in other countries. 0. KAHN-
FREUND, supra note 3, at 198.
63. See generally Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72; Employment Act, 1980, ch.
42. Both are attempts to eliminate the closed shop.
64. See D. JACKSON, UNFAIR DISMISSAL: HOW AND WHY THE LAW WORKS 4-6
(1975).
65. Id. at 4. A contract of service characterized employer-employee relationships.
Smith v. Geneva Motor Cab Co., 1911 A.C. 188. There were four "indicia of a contract
of service:" the payment of wages, the employer's control of' the work, the employer's
ability to select the employee, and the employer's right to dismiss the employee. Short v.
J. and W. Henderson. Ltd.. 1946 Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 24, :33-34; Goald v. Minister of
National Insurance, [1951] 1 K.B. 731, 7214. Although these criteria could be aftected by
statute, Short at 34, they indicate that in general the employer's control was essential to
the relationship. Reasonable notice was held to require from as little as one week, Evans
v. Ware, 11892] 3 Ch. 502, 504, to as much Ls one year, Grundy v. Sun Printing and
Publishing Association, [1916] 33 T.L.R. 77; Savage v. British Indian Stream Navigation
Co. Ltd., [1930] 46 T.L.R. 294. The Contracts of Employment Act, 1963, ch. 49, § 4(1)
established the rights of employees to have, if there was no written contract, a written
statement detailing such particulars as the rate and frequency of payment, and other
terms and conditions of employment. The Act also required a minimum period of notice
for dismissal, which varied with the length of service. Id § I. For a discussion of the
contract of employment in employment law, see Forrest, Political Values in Individual
Employment Law, 43 MOD. L. REv. 361, 363 (1980).
66. General Billposting Co. Ltd. v. Atkinson, 1909 A.C. 118. The employee could
sue for repudiation of contract, or in quantum meruit for the value of the work per-
formed, by treating the contract as rescinded on the basis of the employer's act. Cutter v.
Powell, [1795] 6 Term Rep. 320; Emmens v. Elderton, [1853] 13 C.B. 495, (H.L.), 509 (per
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losses incurred during a reasonable period of notice.67 More impor-
tantly, the employer did not have to state a reason for the dismis-
sal. 68 In addition, the common law on "restraint of trade" made any
worker combination illegal if it was established to injure an individ-
ual in his or her trade rather than to defend the trade of the combin-
ing members. This principle applied to the enforcement of closed
shop agreements against individuals who refused to join, resigned
from, or were dismissed from a union.69
In 1971, the British government passed the Industrial Relations
Act, 1971 establishing statutory rights which attempted to protect
employees from unfair dismissal.70  The Industrial Relations Act
restricted the ability of an employer to dismiss an employee without
providing a reason.7' It also granted the individual employee the
right not to belong to a trade union,'72 a right enforceable by either
reinstatement or compensatory damages.73 Furthermore, the Act
outlawed restrictive hiring practices based on union membership
(hiring halls),74 and established the right to form "agency shops" for
Crompton, J.); Goodman v. Pocock, [1850] 15 Q.B. 576, 580 (per Campbell, J.); Pritchett
v. Badger, [1856] 1 C.B.N.S. 296, 305 (per Williams, J.).
67. D. JACKSON, supra note 64, at 4-5. See French v. Brooks, [1830] 6 Bing. 354;
Burton v. Pinkerton, [1867] 2 L.R.-Ex. 340; Hartley v. Harman, [1840] 11 Ad. & E. 798
(damages for breach of notice precludes those for work and labor); Goodman v. Pocock,
[1850] 15 Q.B. 576; Hochster v. De la Tour, [1853] 2 E. & B. 678 (intended breach of
promise is grounds for suit); Brace v. Calder, [1895] 2 Q.B. 253, (C.A.).
68. Ridgeway v. Hungerford Market Co., [1835] 3 Ad. & El. 171; Cussons v. Skinner,
[1843] 11 M. & W. 161. Paradoxically, an employer did not have to have a reason at time
of discharge, but at time of trial the tribunal had to be able to find a reason.
69. Morgan v. Fry, [1967] 2 All E.R. 386; Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367
(threat by union members to strike unless non-union member dismissed, when a closed
shop is in force, constitutes the tort of intimidation); Huntley v. Thornton, [1957] 1 All
E.R. 234 (union secretary's threat to call a strike unless non-union member was dis-
missed, failed to support a claim of conspiracy because it was not intended to injure
plaintiff, but to protect union interests; however, the same conduct constitutes unlawful
intimidation).
70. Industrial Relations Act, 1971 ch. 72, § 22-33. Under the statute, unfair dismissal
constitutes an unfair industrial practice, and the victims of such practices may bring their
claims before industrial tribunals. Id § 106.
71. Id. § 24(1).
72. Id § 5(l)(b). The purpose of this section was to undercut the closed shop. Par-
liament adopted the policy that was formulated by the Conservative Political Centre.
See FAIR DEAL AT WORK, THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO MODERN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS (1968), cited in 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 3, at 202. The Industrial Rela-
tions Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 5(l)(a) gave employees the right to membership in a trade union
of his or her choice.
73. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 106(2)-(5).
74. Id § 7. This section bans "pre-entry" closed shop agreements. A pre-entry
closed shop agreement prohibits an individual from applying for a job unless he or she is
a member of a particular union. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 3, at 196. A pre-entry
closed shop agreement is to be distinguished from a post-entry closed shop agreement, in
which every employee must join the union within a certain time after accepting a job. Id
at 196-97.
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registered unions.75 In practice, the Industrial Relations Act failed
to restrict closed shop arrangements, primarily because such agree-
ments are informal, and, therefore, the statute prohibiting them is
difficult to enforce. 76 In addition, such agreements are popular
among both workers and employers.77
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, repealed the
Industrial Relations Act, 1971178 The new legislation79 re-enacted
several sections of the earlier statute, however, including those provi-
sions that protect employees from unfair dismissals, and required
employers to show good cause before dismissing an employee.80 The
new Act, although it allowed closed shops, also provided a founda-
tion from which an employee could object to forced membership in a
particular union. As a general principle, the 1974 Act provided that
the dismissal of an employee was unfair if based solely on that
employee's membership, or proposed membership, in a union.81
Under the Act, however, a dismissal for failure to join a union would
be fair if all the employees of a particular employer belonged to a
"specified independent trade union,"82 and if the fired employee was
not a member of, or had refused to join, that union.83 But even in
these legitimate circumstances, dismissal would be considered unfair
if the employee objected "on grounds of religious belief to being a
member of any trade union whatsoever" or "on any reasonable
grounds to being a member of a particular trade union. '8 4 Two
years later, however, the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Amendment) Act, 1976, repealed the provision of the 1974 Act that
permitted an employee to refuse to participate in a closed shop
agreement if the employee had "reasonable grounds" for such
75. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 11. An agency shop is an agreement
allowing individual workers either to become union members, or to contributd to a union
fund or a charity. Id Section 12 provided for balloting by workers on the question of
whether an agency shop should be instituted. The fact that only registered unions were
eligible to form agency shops allowed employers and unions with more informal
arrangements to avoid the strictures of the Act. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 3, at 202.
76. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 3, at 199. Kahn-Freund asserts that the inability
of the law to "supress practices based on informal and generally shared understandings
of the workers" is one of the strongest arguments against legislating to restrict the closed
shop. Id
The lack of cooperation by the trade unions also may explain the failure of the statute:
the Trade Union Congress and its affiliates actively opposed the legislation. Id at 203-
04. See also GREEN PAPER, supra note 6, at 67.
77. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
78. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § I(1).
79. Id. sees. 4-15, sched. I §§ 22-23.
80. Id sees. 4, 6, sched. 1, §§ 22, 24.
81. Id sec. 6(4), sched. 1, § 24.
82. Id § 6(5), sched. 1.
83. Id
84. Id
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refusal.85
Court interpretations of the 1974 and 1976 Acts have reinforced
the restrictive effects of union membership agreements on the right
of individual workers to refuse to join a specific union. In Home
County Dairies Ltd v. Woods, 86 the Employment Appeals Tribunal 87
reasoned that a union membership agreement between the employer
and the union controlled all union membership issues, and thereby
superseded the provision in an individual's employment contract,
which provided a right not to join a union.88 In Himpfen v. Allied
Records Ltd, 8 9 the Tribunal found that an employee was dismissed
unfairly because the employer had dismissed the employee after he
joined a union other than the one that was specified by the closed
shop agreement. At the same time, however, the Tribunal construed
the phrase "dismissal. . .shall be regarded as fair. . .[if] it is the
practice ... for all employees. . . to belong to the specified union,"
to require a showing that "almost all" employees belonged to the
union.90 Under the Tribunal's construction of the Act, a shop need
not be "closed" completely, and still the dismissal of an employee
who refused to join a union would be labeled "fair." In Himpfen,
however, the Tribunal found that a significant number of employees
were not union members. Hence, even the liberalized "almost all"
condition was not satisfied, and the dismissals were found to be
unfair.91 Employment Appeal Tribunals have also held that an
employer's genuine belief that an employee was not a union member
85. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1976, ch. 7 § l(e). The Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44 § 58(3) consolidated the provisions of the
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52 § 6(5), Sched. 1 as amended by the
1976 Act, along with other employment laws. The Government viewed the broad rea-
sonable grounds exception in the 1974 Act as a threat to closed shop agreements. Eng-
land & Rees, The Trade Union andLabour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976 39 MOD. L.
REv. 698, 699 (1976).
86. 1977 Indus. Cas. R. 463.
87. The Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 87 originally established the
Employment Appeals Tribunal, and The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act,
1978, ch. 44, § 135 perpetuated its existence. The Tribunal adjudicates appeals from
industrial tribunals concerning various statutes.
88. 1977 Indus. Cas. R. at 467-68. This decision seems harsh even in light of the 1974
and 1976 legislative efforts to protect the closed shop. Although the legislation obviously
favored the closed shop, the 1974 Act also relegated collectively bargained agreements to
their status at common law; that is, such agreements were not enforceable as binding
contracts. The explicit right not to join a trade union, as set forth in the employee's
contract, therefore, ought to have controlled.
89. 1978 Indus. Cas. R. 684.
90. Id at 689-91. Note that in Taylor v. Co-operative Retail Services, 1982 Indus.
Cas. R. 600, Fox, L.J., in reference to the interpretation of "practice" in the 1976 Amend-
ments, stated that Himpfen did not give "any authoritative guidance... since it appears
to proceed upon the basis that the word 'all' remains in paragraph 6(5) as amended by
the Act of 1976." Id at 613.
91. Id at 689.
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is sufficient to render a dismissal fair; it is irrelevant that the
employee was either a member or entitled to be a member of the
union.92
A conservative British government modified its posture on
closed shop agreements by passing the Employment Act, 1980.93
Section 7 of the Act makes it unfair to dismiss an employee for not
joining a union if the employee "genuinely objects" to membership
on the "grounds of conscience or other deeply-held personal convic-
tions," if the union membership agreement became effective after the
employee's term of employment began, or if the union membership
agreement was signed but not approved on the effective date of the
1980 Act.94
Under section 3(4) of the Employment Act, 1980, the Depart-
ment of Employment promulgated a Code of Practice on Closed
Shop Agreements and Arrangements. 95 The Code provides "that
any agreement or practice on union membership should protect
basic individual rights; should enjoy the overwhelming support of
92. Gayle v. John Wilkinson and Sons (Saltley) Ltd., 1978 Indus. Cas. R. 154;
Lakhani v. Hoover, 1978 Indus. Cas. R. 1063.
93. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42.
94. Id § 7. The Employment Act, 1980 retained the provisions of the Trade Union
and Labour Relations Acts of 1974 and 1976, as consolidated in the Employment Protec-
tion (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 58(3) which permitted an employer to dismiss an
employee for not joining a union if a union membership agreement existed. See supra
notes 34 & 85. It also expanded the grounds by which an employee could be exempted
from a closed shop requirement. The statute provided:
(3A) The dismissal of an employee.., shall be regarded as unfair if he genu-
inely objects on grounds of conscience or other deeply-held personal conviction
to being a member of any trade union whatsoever or of a particular trade union.
(3B) The dismissal of an employee by an employer.., shall be regarded as
unfair if the employee--
(a) has been among those employees of the employer who belong to the
class to which the union membership agreement relates since before the
agreement had the effect of requiring them to be or become members of a
trade union, and
(b) has not at any time while the agreement had that effect been a member
of a trade union in accordance with the agreement.
(3C) Where a union membership agreement takes effect after the commence-
ment of section 7 of the Employment Act 1980 in relation to the employees of
any class of an employer, and an employee of that class is dismissed by the
employer.... the dismissal shall be regarded as unfair if-
(a) the agreement has not been approved in relation to those employ-
ees... or
(b) it has been so approved through a ballot in which the dismissed
employee was entitled to vote, but he has not at any time since the day on
which the ballot was held been a member of a trade union in accordance
with the agreement.
Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 7. Section 7(3) contains a requirement that 80% of the
employees entitled to vote must approve a union membership agreement in a secret
ballot.
95. DEP'T OF EMPL., CODE OF PRACTICE: CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENTS AND
ARRANGEMENTS (1980).
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those affected; and be flexibly and tolerantly applied. ' 96 The Code
requires that closed shop arrangements be the product of mutual
agreements between employees and unions, and encourages employ-
ers to be attentive to employee sentiment concerning union member-
ship.97 The Code also includes provisions requiring review of closed
shop arrangements. 98
The position of the Department of Employment regarding
closed shop agreements, as expressed by James Prior, then British
Secretary of Employment,99 was that such arrangements were inimi-
cal to personal liberty.lco Prior noted that closed shops not only
infringe on the personal liberty of an employee by making union
membership a condition of employment, but that certain practices
associated with such agreements also impede economic efficiency.
These provisions include denying business to firms whose workers
are not unionized, refusing to handle non-union made goods, refus-
ing to work with non-union labor, and insisting on "union labor
only" clauses in subcontracts. l0 1 Prior also maintained that the
existence of closed shops had failed to reduce industrial conflict.
0 2
He recommended the elimination of closed shops, the periodic
review of institutions with closed shop arrangements, and the enact-
ment of laws that prohibit the unreasonable operation of closed
shops.103
96. Id at 1. Section 3(8) of the Employment Act, 1980, requires that the Code be
admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 3(8).
97. DEP'T OF EMPL., supra note 95, at 6.
98. Id at 11-12. The parties are to conduct reviews every few years (or more fre-
quently when employee support for the closed shop arrangement declines), when the law
or the parties to the agreement change, or when the agreement fails to work satisfactorily.
Upon review, the parties have several options: they can amend the agreement, hold a
secret ballot to test employee opinion, or terminate the agreement. Id at 12. In this
context, the Code discourages pre-entry closed shops. Id
The Code of Practice on closed shops has been criticized for its failure to define such
phrases as "deeply held personal conviction," that are critical to the Code's protection of
individual rights in closed shop agreements. 10 INDUS. L.J. 45 (1981).
99. Prior is currently secretary to Northern Ireland.
100. GREEN PAPER, supra note 3, at 66.
101. id at 66, 60-74. See also 0. KAHN-FREUND supra note 3, at 196. Kahn-Freund
acknowledged the argument that closed shops inhibit free access to jobs, thus negatively
effecting economic development and optimal use of labor. He also maintained that "if
there are to be restrictions of access they should be imposed by organs of government
responsible through democratic processes, and not by private organisations who are not
publicly responsible." Id Other possible effects include depriving individuals of oppor-
tunity, suppressing minority opinion, and giving trade unions too much power over the
individual.
102. GREEN PAPER, supra note 3, at 66.
103. Id at 68-70. One problem with prohibiting closed shop arrangements, as Prior
observed, is that collective agreements are not "enforceable at law." Id at 68. He noted
the argument that such a law would fail to eliminate so "established a feature of our
industrial relations system." Id at 69.
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Proposals that closed shop agreements be prohibited or cur-
tailed overlook certain critical factors relevant to industrial life in
modem England. Those factors become evident upon analyzing the
history of British legislative efforts to control the closed shop. Trade
unions have become a major political force in Britain, and as one
author asserts, they serve the same function for employees as work-
ers as the vote does for individuals as citizens.' 04 Naturally, the
political power of the unions engenders conflicts with other political
entities, primarily the government and the business community.
Consequently, any realistic evaluation of the issues raised by closed
shops must place those issues within the proper political framework,
and must recognize the necessity of accommodating both the inter-
ests of the individual in freedom of association and the collective
interest of labor in preserving its political power. An international
agreement, such as the Convention on Human Rights, may provide
some guidelines for developing that political framework. Thus, the
Court's analysis of the right of freedom of association as applied to
the British closed shop system may prove to be quite significant.
B. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION
Since the inception of the European Convention on Human
Rights in 1950, it has been unclear whether Article 11 protects both
the positive right to join and the negative right not to join a trade
union or association. 0 5 That question arose in the Young, James,
and Webster. The Convention does not directly address the closed
shop question. The United Nations Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, however, a primary source for the text of the Euro-
pean Convention, states that "no one may be compelled to belong to
an association."' 10 6 Because of the difficulties that this provision
raised for the existing closed shop systems in member countries, the
language was not included in the European Convention. 0 7 The
European Commission and Court, however, have addressed the
104. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 3, at 201.
105. See Travaux Preparatoires, supra note 5, at 262; P. WALLINGTON AND J.
MCBRIDE, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND A BILL OF RIGHTS 57 (1976). For remarks on this ques-
tion in the context of a general discussion of Article 11, see F. CASTBERG, supra note 15,
at 152; J.E.S. FAWCETT, supra note 17, at 222; F. JACOBS, supra note 11, at 157; and A.H.
ROBERTSON, supra note 11, at 30.
106. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14.
107. TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES, supra note 5, at 262. Under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, however, preparatory work does not control the interpretation of
a treaty. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Supplementary Means of Interpretation
(as opposed to the General Rules of Interpretation in Article 31) provides:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order
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closed shop question in the context of Article 11 of the Convention.
In National Union of Belgian Police, 108 the Court construed the
phrase in Article 11 "for the protection of [one's] interests"' 0 9 to
mean that contracting states must allow for the protection of occupa-
tional interests through trade union activity.10 In X v. Belgium, I'
the Commission suggested that the right to join an association
implies the right not to join." 2 Moreover, in the Case of Young,
James and Webster, the Commission found that the language of
Article 11 implicity grants workers the right to choose the union that
is best able to protect their interests, or to form a new union." 3
Upon review, a majority of the European Court specifically
refused to address this question.'" 4 In a concurring opinion, how-
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to deter-
mine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 (Article 32).
The United Kingdom argued before the Commission that the failure to include the
sentence "No one may be compelled to belong to an association" protected the closed
shop. Comm'n Report, supra note 35, at 35. The Commission dismissed this argument on
the ground that the drafting history of the document was not "specifically related to the
practice at issue, namely the dismissal for refusal to join specific unions." Id at 36.
108. [1975] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 294 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights)
(Judgment).
109. For a full citation, see supra note I.
110. [1975] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 294, 296 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights)
(Judgment). In National Union, the Court held "that the Convention safeguards freedom
to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by trade union action, the
conduct and development of which states must both permit and make possible." Id
111. [1970] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 708 (Eur. Comm. on Human
Rights) (decision).
112. Id at 718. The case concerned a Belgian worker dismissed from his job, alleg-
edly because he did not belong to a trade union. Id at 712. The Commission dismissed
the application because it could not find a violation of Article 11. The Commission
stated that "the very concept of freedom of association with others also implies freedom
not to associate with others or not to join trade unions." Id at 718.
113. Corm'n Report, supra note 35, at 34. The Commission noted that the right to
form a new union was particularly important because unions have political philosophies
with which workers may disagree. Id The Commission based its holding on the deci-
sion of the Court in National Union of Belgian Police Case, [1976] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 294 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights) (Judgment).
The Commission has also distinguished the right to form or join a trade union fronm
the right to administer or manage one. X v. Belgium, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 324, 336-38 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights) (decision). In addition,
the Commission found a violation of Article 11 where threats of dismissal were used to
encourage a worker to give up his trade union activity. X v. Ireland, [1971] Y.B. EUR.
CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 198, 222 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights) (decision).
114. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 17. The Court's more limited hold-
ing was that workers who were hired before an employer entered a closed shop agree-
ment could not be forced to join the union. The Court did note, however, "that the right
to form and join trade unions is a special aspect of freedom of association ... the notion
of a freedom implies some measure of freedom of choice as to its exercise." Id More-
over, the Court also noted that "it does not follow that the negative aspect of a person's
freedom of association falls completely outside the ambit of Article 11 and that each and
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ever, seven judges criticized the limited scope of the holding of the
majority. The concurring judges reasoned that the freedom to asso-
ciate includes, as a corollary, the freedom not to associate, and that a
freedom of association necessarily includes freedom of choice.' 15
The judges explained that the existence of trade union freedom, a
form of freedom of association, implies that an employee can choose
not to join an association. Consequently, compulsory membership
violated Article 11, and dismissal for failure to join merely aggra-
vated the violation.1 6
The view of the concurring judges regarding the freedom of
employees to choose not to join a union is sound. Article 11 permits
individuals to "join or form trade unions."' l 7 This language is sig-
nificant because it implies that individuals are free to decide what is
in their best interests when deciding whether or not to join a trade
union. If individuals do not believe-that a particular union advances
their interests, they may join another union or form their own." 8
Consequently, one can infer that individuals are free to decide that
no union advances their interests, and to choose not to be
represented.
In addition, the reasoning of the majority is less convincing than
that of the concurrence because the majority never sets forth the ele-
ments that are essential to the proper implementation of the Conven-
tion's freedom of association provision. The majority argued that "a
threat of dismissal involving loss of livelihood is a most serious form
of compulsion."" 9 In so arguing, the Court assumed that the "nega-
tive" aspect of freedom of association was not necessarily protected
every compulsion to join a particular trade union is compatible with the intention of that
provision." Id
115. Id at 24.
116. Id The concurrence states:
Trade union freedom, a form of freedom of association, involves freedom of
choice: it implies that a person has a choice as to whether he will belong to an
association or not and that, in the former case, he is able to choose the associa-
tion. However, the possibility of choice, an indispensable component of freedom
of association, is in reality non-existent where there is a trade union monopoly of
the kind encountered in the present case.
Here, the sanction-be it the giving of notice or dismissal-which was a conse-
quence of the system instituted by the law, did not give rise to but simply aggra-
vated the violation. The violation, already constituted by compulsion in the
shape of obligatory membership, is irreconcilable with the freedom of choice that
is inherent in freedom of association.
Id at 24.
117. Comm'n Report, supra note 35, at 34. The Commission stated: "[I]t is significant
that Art. I1 uses the plural 'unions.' This shows that a trade union monopoly is
excluded. There must be room for more than one union." Id
118. Id
119. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 18.
1982] CASE OF YOUNG, JAMES, AND WEBSTER
to the same extent as the "positive" aspect.' 20 The Court concluded
that compelling an individual to join a union "may not always be
contrary to the Convention."' 2' The Court also stated, however, that
"some measure of freedom of choice" is involved in the basic con-
cept of a freedom.' 22 The Court ultimately failed to articulate fully
the parameters of an individual's right to freedom of association.
Therefore it is difficult to discern what elements the Court views as
integral to that right. 2 3 The Court's opinion does not explain why
the degree, or seriousness of the compulsion, rather than the mere
fact of compulsion, violates freedom of association, 124 but the
majority appears to view the right of freedom of association as a
more flexible concept than does the concurrence. The Court's failure
to explain what is integral to the right provides signatory states with
little indication of what forms of compulsion will be "serious"
enough to constitute a violation of the right of freedom of associa-
tion. While the facts of the Case of Young, James, and Webster may
not have warranted a broad policy ruling, some explanation of the
principles underlying the right of freedom of association would have




122. Id at 17.
123. Note that the Court's desire to limit its decision to the facts at issue, see supra
note 55 and accompanying text, does not justify its failure to address the question as to
what principles are integral to Article 11. The problem is not one of extending the deci-
sion, but of determining the basis for suggesting that some forms of compulsion violate
Article I I while others do not. The concurrence, however, by emphasizing that the ele-
ment of choice is crucial to the interpretation of freedom of association, establishes a
foundation for arguing that forcing a worker to join a union violates Article 11.
124. If one accepts the argument of the concurrence, i.e., the concept of choice is inte-
gral to freedom of association, then the fact that the closed shop in Young, James, and
Webster took effect after the workers were hired is irrelevant, despite the Court's empha-
sis on that aspect of the case. The following example illustrates why even where an
employee initially has consented to compelled union membership, the majority's position
raises problems.
Suppose that, in a closed shop situation, the individual has joined the required union.
If the particular union holding a closed shop agreement is less than wholly satisfactory,
the choices of the workers are limited. At that point they cannot join or form a new
union which might be more satisfactory. Nor, if the workers wish to continue to work,
can they leave the union.
It may be said that in a situation such as this, the employees have consented. If the
initial consent, however, was given under the threat of dismissal, or with the possibility,
in a heavily unionized society, of never finding a job, the employee's acquiescence could
not be labeled as consensual. This is especially true in times of high unemployment.
The Young, James, and Webster decision leaves an individual's Article I I freedom of
association unprotected in such a situation. As a matter of policy, the decision gives no
incentive to trade unions to represent their members fairly once they have a closed shop
agreement, nor does it encourage signatory states to police trade unions to ensure such
representation.
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The failure of the Young, James, and Webster majority to
address the issue of whether or not Article 11 implies a freedom not
to associate is disappointing. At the same time, however, the Court
must be applauded for recognizing the plight of Young, James, and
Webster. Perhaps this decision will at least provide the United
Kingdom and the other signatories with some incentive to interpret
their obligations liberally when legislating in the trade union area.
III. THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY AND THE
ROLE OF THE CONVENTION IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVENTION IN BRITISH
DOMESTIC LAW
The three railway workers raised a second issue in the Case of
Young, James, and Webster; they contended that the United King-
dom had denied them their right to an effective remedy before a
national authority, in direct contravention of Article 13 of the Con-
vention. 25 Young, James, and Webster alleged that they had no
effective remedy to vindicate their Article 11 right to freedom of asso-
ciation because the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1976
authorized their dismissals. Because it has not been enacted by Par-
liament, the Convention does not have the force of domestic law in
the United Kingdom;126 Young, James, and Webster could not have
125. Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 14.
126. WADE AND PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 276-77. The authors define the term con-
vention as relating to "multilateral law-making treaties" and explain: "The provisions
of a treaty duly ratified do not by virtue of the treaty alone have the force of municipal
law. The assent of Parliament must be obtained and the necessary legislation passed
before a court of law can enforce the treaty, should it conflict with the existing law." Id
at 277. In practice, however, treaties "are concluded on the advice of Ministers, who will
normally be in a position to command a majority in Parliament." Id Parliament cannot
modify or reject a treaty the government has made without censuring the government
which was responsible for the particular treaty. See ld Furthermore, if the United King-
dom is to ratify a treaty that it has signed, as it did with the Convention, the treaty win
usually lie before Parliament for 21 days. Id at 279. The Sovereign then ratifies the
treaty. It should be noted that the consent of Parliament is not required for the making
or the satisfaction of a treaty in the United Kingdom. Id
In Britain, customary rules of international law are deemed to be part of the domestic
law. Lord Alverstone in West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. R., [1905] 2 K.B.
391 (A.A.,) at 406-407, stated, "whatever has received the common consent of civilized
nations must have received the assent of our country." British courts have held, however,
that the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty requires that British law control where
there is a conflict between the provisions of a British statute and an international obliga-
tion. Collco Dealings, Ltd. v. I.R.C., [1961] 1 All E.R. 762,765. As Drzemczewski states:
The practice as to treaties is conditioned basically upon the constitutional
principles which limit the Executive's power to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties
(that is to say, the prerogative powers of the Crown) in that constitutionally the
Executive is not competent to enact or modify legislation. . . . Constitution-
ally, therefore, any treaty which requires a change in domestic law-in order to
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complained about the violation of their Article 11 rights before a
British court, because the British courts would have been bound to
enforce the 1976 Act.
A discussion of the applicability of the Convention in British
domestic law will demonstrate how the Article 13 problem arose in
the Case of Young, James, and Webster. This section of the Note will
also explain how the British judiciary used the Convention both
before and after the Court's decision in Young, James, and Webster.
As the discussion will demonstrate, the response of the British judici-
ary to the decision of the European Court, does not provide an ade-
quate solution to the Article 13 problem.
Before the European Court's decision in Young, James, and
Webster, British judges referred to the provisions of the Convention
when they supported or supplemented the existing British law.127
They did this despite the fact that the provisions of the Convention
could not be enforced directly in British courts. For instance, in
Waddington v. Miah, 128 the House of Lords determined that because
Article 2 of the European Convention forbade the imposition of
criminal sanctions based on retrospective laws, it was "hardly credi-
ble that any government department would promote or that Parlia-
ment would pass retrospective criminal legislation."1 29 In Birdi v.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 130 Lord Denning suggested that
parliamentary acts should be construed in a manner that is consis-
make law conform with the provisions of the treaty and be enforceable by
domestic tribunals--requires that the necessary legislation be enacted.
Drzemczewski, Implementation of the United Kingdom's Obligations, supra note 6, at 98.
For a general discussion of parliamentary sovereignty, see WADE AND PHILLIPS, supra
note 6, at 38-61.
Some European countries do not require legislation to make their treaty obligations
part of domestic law; their international agreements are self-executing. States in which
the Convention has the force of law include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Swit-
zerland, and Turkey. See Drzemczewski, Authority of the Findings, supra note 7, at 8.
Note that recently Parliament failed to pass a bill which would have given the Conven-
tion effect as domestic law. See H.L. Bill No. 100, 48/1 (1979).
127. For a general discussion of this development, see Drzemczewski, Implementation
of the United Kingdom's Obligations, supra note 6, at 98-109; Duffy, English Law and the
European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585, 586-96 (1980); Com-
ment, The European Convention on Human Rights and the British Courts, 12 TEXAs INT'L
L.J. 61 (1977). In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Phan-
sopkar and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Begum, [1975] 3
All E.R. 497, 510-11, the court noted that certain human rights relating to family life
were protected by the Magna Carta and "reinforced" by the European Convention.
128. [1974] 2 All E.R. 377.
129. Id at 379.
130. [1975] Sol. J. 322 (C.A.) The case involved an illegal immigrant who requested
permission to remain in the United Kingdom following an announcement by the Home
Secretary that he would not order the removal of illegal immigrants from certain coun-
tries provided they had arrived before January 1, 1973. The immigrant was jailed pend-
ing his removal when immigration officials determined that he had arrived after January
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tent with the terms of the Convention.' 3' He reiterated this conclu-
sion in A v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Bhajan
Singh, 132 but also noted that an Act of Parliament must prevail over
conflicting treaty obligations that had not been enacted by Parlia-
ment. 133 Furthermore, in A v. Chief Immigration Officer, ex parte
Salamat Bibi, 134 Lord Denning held that government immigration
officers need not rely on the principles of the Convention when
applying immigration rules. 135
Following the decision in Young, James, and Webster, the Brit-
ish Court of Appeal has continued to rely on the Convention when it
is not directly in conflict with the domestic law. In Cheall v. Associa-
tion of Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff, 136 the
court invalidated a notice terminating Cheall's union membership.
The Association of Professional Executive Clerical and Computer
Staff (APEX) expelled Cheall pursuant to the association's member-
ship rules. These rules permitted the expulsion of a member when
that action was necessary in order to comply with a Trade Union
Congress (TUC) disputes committee decision. 137 The court found
1, 1973. The Court found that the immigration officials had acted fairly, and that there
had been no violation of any right protected by the Convention.
131. Id
132. [1975] 2 All E.R. 1081. Lord Denning asserted that the Convention should be
taken into account whenever a court interprets a statute affecting individual rights. He
based his statement on the assumption that "the Crown, in taking its part in legislation,
would do nothing which was in conflict with treaties." Id at 1083. In Begum, supra note
127, at 511, Scarman LJ. interpreted Bhajan Singh as requiring attention to the Conven-
tion in "interpreting and applying the law."
133. [1975] 2 All E.R. at 1083. In Birdi, Denning had indicated that he might invali-
date legislation that conflicted with the Convention.
134. [1976] 3 All E.R. 843.
135. Id at 847. The case concerned the actions of an immigration officer. The court
explained:
They [immigration officers] cannot be expected to know or to apply the conven-
tion. They must go simply by the immigration rules laid down by the Secretary
of State and not by the convention .... The convention is drafted in a style
very different from the way which we are used to in legislation. It contains wide
general statements of principle .... So it is much better for us to stick to our
own statutes and principles, and only look to the convention for guidance in case
of doubt.
Id at 847-48. For other cases which continue the trend of using the Convention for
purposes of guidance and not as part of English domestic law, see Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Department of Trade, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 257; Blaythwayt v. Lord
Cawley, [1975] 3 All E.R. 625; Ahmad v. Inner London Education Authority, THE
TIMES, March 22, 1977, at 9, col. 3; Ostreicher v. Secretary of State for Environment, THE
TIMEs, May 5, 1977, at 7, col. 1; and R. v. Secretary for the Home Department, ex parte
Hosenball [1977] 3 All E.R. 452.
136. 1982 Indus. Cas. R. 543.
137. Id at 552. Cheall was expelled when he resigned from a rival union, and then
joined APEX. APEX failed to inquire into whether the rival union objected to Cheall's
transfer before allowing him to join. This contravened TUC rules. Note that a closed
shop agreement was not involved in Cheall.
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that APEX had resorted to the use of this expulsion rule because of
its own deliberate failure to observe a TUC principle. Therefore, the
court ruled that APEX could not take advantage of its own miscon-
duct. 138 In reaching this conclusion, Lord Denning referred to the
"fundamental principle ' 139 of Article 11 of the Convention. He
noted that despite the repeal of a section of the Industrial Relations
Act, 1971, which might have protected Cheall, the plaintiff neverthe-
less retained his right to join a trade union of his choice under both
the common law and the Convention. 14° With regard to the Con-
vention, Denning stated:
Every man could, by going to the European Court of Human Rights at
Strasbourg, vindicate his rights under the Convention. Just as the three
railwaymen did when they were dismissed for refusing to join a trade union.
The European Court of Human Rights directed that the United Kingdom
Government should pay compensation to the three railwaymen. That was on
August 13, 1981, in Young v. United Kingdom . . . By being vindicated in
this way, we reach the conclusion that article 11(1) of the Convention is part
of the law of England or at any rate the same as the law of England. The
courts of England should themselves give effect to it rather than put a citizen
to all the trouble and expense of going to the European Court of Human
Rights at Strasbourg. Our courts should themselves uphold the right of every
man to join a trade union of his choice for the protection of his interests. 14 1
The Court of Appeal also discussed Article 11 and Young,
James, and Webster in Taylor v. Co-operative Retail Services.' 42 In
Taylor, the complaint of the plaintiff was dismissed in an action
brought before the Employment Appeals Tribunal; the Court of
Appeal, in affirming the tribunal, rejected Taylor's claim that he had
been unfairly dismissed for failing to join a union when a closed
shop was in effect. 143 The court decided the case under the Labour
Relations Act, 1976, which was in force at the time Taylor was dis-
missed. 144 The court found that, because the employer had satisfied
all conditions of the Act, the dismissal was fair.' 45 The court noted
that, had Taylor's case gone to the European Court, it would have
been governed by the decision in Young, James, and Webster. 146
The Court of Appeal observed, however, that Taylor could not
recover damages from his employers. 147 The court stated that "[t]he
United Kingdom government is responsible for passing those Acts
138. Id at 557, 574.
139. Id at 553.
140. Id at 554.
141. Id at 554-55.
142. 1982 Indus. Cas. R. 600.
143. Id at 602.
144. Id at 610.
145. Id at 607-08, 611-13.
146. Id at 610 (per Denning, L.J.)
147. Id
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and should pay him compensation. . ." Taylor's employers, on the
other hand, could not be required to pay damages as they had done
nothing that the Act did not allow. 148
Despite the laudable attempts of the British judiciary to inter-
pret the Convention so that it is consistent with domestic law, the
fact that the British government has not enacted the Convention into
its domestic law continues to present problems. The Case of Young,
James, and Webster demonstrates that when the domestic law of a
signatory state conflicts with Convention rights, individuals may be
unable to secure a remedy without going before the European Com-
mission and Court. It is questionable whether such a remedy can be
termed either "national" or "effective."
B. THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY AND THE INTERNAL
LAW OF SIGNATORY GOVERNMENTS
Article 13 of the European Convention establishes an individual
right to an effective remedy before a national authority. 149 An inter-
pretational problem emerges as to exactly what domestic action the
High Contracting Parties bound themselves to perform by agreeing
to provide an effective remedy before a national authority. 50 British
law requires that domestic legislation control when that legislation is
in conflict with a provision of the Convention. Young, James, and
Webster illustrates the types of issues that arise when such a conflict
develops. Thus, the question naturally arises as to whether Britain
currently provides individuals whose Convention rights have been
violated with an effective remedy.' 51
148. Id
149. For the text of the Article see supra note 2.
150. Two schools of international legal theory address the domestic consequences that
follow the adoption of international treaties. The monist school believes that interna-
tional and domestic law are actually part of the same system, and, therefore, interna-
tional obligations are automatically binding in domestic law. The dualist school
maintains that domestic and international agreements are separate systems of rules, and
consequently, international obligations first must be enacted before they become part of
a state's domestic law.
151. For a discussion of the issue, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNAL
LAW, (A.H. Robertson ed. 1968), [especially Sorenson, Obligations of a State Party to a
Treaty as Regards its Municipal Law, Id at I1; Ganshof van der Meersch, Does the Con-
vention Have the Force of "Ordre Public" in Municipal Law?, Id at 97; and Verdross,
Status of the European Convention in the Hierarchy of Rules of Law, Id at 47]. See also
Buerganthal, The Effect of the European Convention on Human Rights on the International
Law ofMember States, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS supra note
11, at 79. CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 157; Drzemczewski, he Domestic Status of the
European on Human Rights: New Dimensions, 1977 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTE-
GRATION 1; JACOBS, supra note 11, at 215.
This Note focuses on duties that the European Convention, through its language,
structure, and history, places on signatory states. The Note uses the United Kingdom to
illustrate problems that have developed under the Convention; however, the Note does
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Several arguments support the contention that in order to
implement Article 13, the signatory states should incorporate the
Convention fights into domestic law. First, Article 13 is an
independent Convention fight; it grants individuals a substantive
fight in the same sense that Article 11, the freedom of association
provision, grants a substantive fight. Article 13 appears among the
civil and political fights, rather than with the procedural and reme-
dial provisions which govern the operation of the Commission and
the Court. Second, one interpretation of Article 13 suggests that the
fight to an effective remedy presupposes that the signatory states will
incorporate the provisions of the Convention into their domestic
law,152 because only then will the judiciaries and administrative
tribunals of the signatory states fully recognize Convention fights. If
these provisions, because they lack the status of municipal law, can-
not be recognized by domestic tribunals, and if the signatory has
established no other mechanism for ensuring an effective remedy,
then individuals will not have a "national authority" that is compe-
tent to protect their Convention rights.153 Moreover, an individual's
not attempt to address the issues that might arise under British law if the United King-
dom attempted to incorporate Convention rights into domestic law. This Note main-
tains, ultimately, that based on the analysis of Article 13 advanced herein, the British
Parliament, like the legislatures of other signatory states where Convention rights still
lack domestic effect, should enact the Convention as domestic law. For a discussion of
some of the issues potentially associated with the incorporation of the Convention into
British law, see Note, Implementing the European Convention on Human Rights in the
United Kingdom, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 147 (1982).
152. Verdross, supra note 151, at 51. Verdross contends:
Although in principle, States are free to determine how an international treaty
shall be implemented, such a treaty may itself prescribe the manner in which it is
to be implemented. Attention is called, in this connection, to Article 13 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, according to which States undertake to
ensure that anyone alleging infringement of the rights guaranteed to him in the
Convention shall have an effective remedy before a national authority. The right
to such a remedy presupposes, however, that the individual provisions of the
Convention have become an integral part of municipal law, for otherwise they
cannot be applied by the authority competent to give a decision. Article 13
therefore indirectly enjoins Contracting States to incorporate the various provi-
sions of the Convention into their municipal law in such a way that they can be
applied directly by domestic courts and administrative authorities and, conse-
quently, also by the supervisory authority provided for in Article 13.
Id See also Drzemczewski, Domestic Status, supra note 151, at 15 (A discussion of Gol-
song's thesis that "recourse can only be effective if the decision reached is binding on all
the authorities of the State concerned.").
153. Verdross, supra note 151, at 51. Buerganthal believes that the parties to the Con-
vention intended "to enable individuals to rely on and invoke [the Convention's] provi-
sions in the courts of the member states." Buerganthal, supra note 151, at 81. He
suggests that by ratifying the Convention, the parties agreed "to remove all domestic
obstacles" preventing individuals from enforcing their Convention rights before domestic
tribunals. See id He asserts that Article 13, read in light of Article I, "creates an obliga-
tion" to make the Convention "directly applicable domestic law," id at 82, and that
states which have not done so are in breach of their Convention obligations. Id at 83.
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remedy cannot be considered "effective" if a domestic tribunal will
not recognize Convention rights because those rights conflict with
domestic legislation. Finally, the language of Article 13 argues
against relying solely on the mechanisms established by the Conven-
tion to provide the remedies required by that section. That language
calls for an effective national remedy. The length of time required to
use effectively the judicial machinery of the Convention tends to
thwart the immediacy of the need for a remedy. In order to avoid
delays that may discourage individuals from pursuing their claims,
signatory states should provide remedies before domestic authorities.
Because the provisions of the Convention often address extreme and
transitory situations, the timeliness of a remedy becomes central to
its effectiveness.
Several other Convention articles also support the interpretation
that participating states should incorporate the rights of the Conven-
tion into their domestic law. Article 1, for example, states that "[t]he
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their juris-
diction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Conven-
tion." 154 The European Court has noted that the intention of Article
1 to secure Convention rights "finds a particularly faithful reflection
in those instances where the Convention has been incorporated into
domestic law."' 55  Moreover, Article 26 requires that, before an
applicant's allegation will be considered justifiable, an applicant to
the Commission must first exhaust all domestic remedies. 56 Domes-
tic incorporation is consistent with the approach of this provision, as
it would encourage a signatory state to attempt to resolve alleged
violations of Convention rights in the first instance. Finally, Article
57 provides that a signatory state must answer inquiries made by the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe regarding how its
domestic law secures a right protected by the Convention. 57 This
154. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 2.
155. Ireland against United Kingdom, [1976] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
512. (European Commission on Human Rights) (decision).
156. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 9.
157. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 14-15. This Article was invoked in
1964, when the Secretary-General invited all Contracting Parties to submit reports
explaining how their domestic law gave effect to the Convention. FAwCETr, supra note
17, at 338. It also was used in 1961 when Turkish delegates to the 1960 Consultative
Assembly were arrested and prevented from attending the meeting. WEIL, supra note 11,
at 167.
In addition, there are two Articles relating to the enforcement of specific Court deci-
sions. Convention Articles 50 and 53 ensure that the decisions of European Court are
enforced in the signatory states. Article 50 allows the Court to give "just satisfaction" to
an individual whose rights have been violated if the law or other authority of a High
Contracting Party is in conflict with the Convention or does not allow for full reparation.
Id at 13. In Young, James, and Webster, supra note 8, at 28, the Court referred the
question of the application of Article 50 back to the Commission with instructions to
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provision indicates that the parties contemplated answering to the
Council of Europe for the adequacy of their domestic law in protect-
ing Convention rights, and expected to reconcile their domestic law
with the provisions of the Convention.
Various arguments indicate the necessity of requiring the signa-
tory states to incorporate the provisions of the Convention into
domestic law. First, the specificity of the international rights enu-
merated in the Convention demonstrates that the rights are not
abstract proposals that the Contracting Parties casually can tailor to
their domestic law. Instead, they are concrete rights that the states
must enforce as written.158 Second, the Convention arguably has the
status of ordre public . 59
Ordrepublic has been defined to include "the rules essential to
the maintenance of general peace and order, the essential rules of
universal morality and respect for fundamental human rights." 160 In
this context, the notion of ordre public emphasizes the pre-eminence
of the public interest, rather than the Convention obligations of each
individual state to the other states, in securing the individual rights
forwarded by the Convention.' 61 The member states, by becoming
signatories to the Convention, established an independent European
report if a friendly settlement were reached. Articles 50 and 53 discuss domestic enforce-
ment of Court decisions, a related issue that is not discused in this Note. For a discussion
of this issue see Buerganthal, supra note 151, at 94-105 (discussion of the domestic res
judicata and precedential effect of Court judgments).
158. Buerganthal, supra note 151, at 82. Buerganthal refers to the drafting history
underlying the Convention to support his theory, noting that a provision requiring signa-
tory states to incorporate the terms of the Convention into their domestic law was not
included in the Convention because the Contracting Parties though this "an obligation
which had already been clearly created in the Convention." Id at 82-83. But see supra
note 135, and infra note 173.
159. Ganshof van der Meersch, supra note 151, at 97, quotes the following definition
of ordre public:
[T]hat body of institutions and rules designed to ensure, in a given country, the
satisfactory functioning of the public services, security and morality of transac-
tions between individuals, who may not exclude their application in private
agreements.
160. Id at 99.
161. Drzemczewski, Domestic Status, supra note 127, at 5. Drzemczewski comments:
IThe remedies available to individuals in cases where their rights have been held
to be violated must be considered in the context of an interest higher than that of
the aggrieved or even that of the Contracting State Party. Stress should be laid
on the preeminence of a certain form of general interest or ordrepublic.
He advances this notion in arguing that the Convention is "suigeneris"; its relationship
to domestic law is different from that of traditional international law. The judicial
organs of the Convention "[examine and determine] whether domestic law as it stands
complies with the provisions of the Convention." Drzemczewski, The Sui Generis Nature
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 54, 54-56 (1980).
The Convention creates a "legal order" which domestic courts, as well as the European
Court and Commission, can enforce. Id; ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE,
supra note 11, at 231.
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judicial body before which individuals can assert their fundamental
human rights within the community. This system protects the rights
of the individual both as a member of the European community and
as a member of an individual state, and makes the state answerable
to the community through the European Court. Although the option
of resorting to the European Court allows individuals to protect their
Convention rights regardless of what action their national govern-
ment takes, the concept of ordrepublic is appealed to more easily
when the Convention is incorporated into domestic law.' 62 Incorpo-
ration guarantees the individual a forum that is more attractive geo-
graphically, culturally, and most likely financially. In short,
incorporation makes both the forum and the remedy more available,
and thus more readily advances the public interest.
There are, however, several arguments supporting the view that
a signatory state need not grant the Convention the status of domes-
tic law in order to implement the language of the Convention. One
interpretation of Article 13 reads it as applying only where the Com-
mission or the Court finds an actual violation of the Convention.
Requiring action at the Convention level before any domestic mech-
anism can be activated, however, effectively denies Article 13 the sta-
tus of an independent right. 63 This argument implies that an
individual has no independent recourse at the domestic level until he
or she has obtained a final determination of relief by the Court or
the Committee of Ministers. 64 Such an outcome robs the language
162. Drzemczewski discusses a related theory; he proposes that the Convention has
become a part of the European Community law, and that at least where Community
issues are involved, the Convention must be applied domestically in the member states
which can bring cases before the European Court of Justice. Drzemczewski, The Domes-
tic Application of the European Human Rights Convention as European Community Law,
30 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 118, 119 (1981); Duffy, supra note 127, at 614-15.
163. CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 158; FAWCETT, supra note 17, at 229; JACoBs, supra
note I1, at 215.
164. The Court rejected this interpretation of Article 13, however, in the Klass case.
Case of Klass and Others [1978] Series A No. 28 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights) (Judgment).
Klass involved legislation that provided that persons under surveillance (by mail, elec-
tronics, etc.) need not receive notice of that surveillance. Applicants contended that this
legislation violated their right to an effective remedy because it prevented them from
determining whether their right to privacy under the Convention had been violated.
Although the Court found no violation of Article 13, it construed Article 13 as requiring
that if an individual claims that his or her Convention rights have been violated, that
individual must have redress before a national authority. The Convention violation need
not be predetermined for an Article 13 remedy to exist. Id. at 29.
Duffy argues that, in general, English law is in harmony with the Klass interpretation
of Article 13. Duffy, supra note 127, at 617. He acknowledges some gaps in the United
Kingdom's fulfillment of its human rights obligations, and suggests that a legislative
body be set up to design legislation to harmonize problematic British laws with Conven-
tion provisions. Id at 618.
Note, in this context, that no Convention provision requires that a state recognize the
right of the individual to petition the Commission under Article 25 of the Convention.
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of Article 13 of its plain meaning, and makes the Article mere sur-
plussage; if the Convention is to have any effect, the articles of the
Convention should not be so construed.
In addition, proponents of the non-incorporationist view main-
tain that states are ordinarily left to implement a treaty in any way
they find appropriate, unless the parties to the treaty provide other-
wise. 165 An implication of this position is that signatories states are
not obligated to use any particular means to secure the Convention
rights of individuals; states simply must abide by the substance of
the Articles. This argument assumes, of course, that at the time the
Convention was signed, the parties did not intend to give effect to the
Convention as domestic law. 66
The Case of Young, James, and Webster, however, demonstrates
the difficulties that arise when the Convention is not accorded the
status of domestic law. The applicants in that case, confronted with
a domestic statute that denied them their Article 11 rights, found no
vindication of those rights in any British tribunal. Arguably, they
could have attempted to bring their case before an appropriate court,
but given the existence of the domestic statute, and the duty that it
imposed on a British court, the outcome of such litigation was pre-
ordained. Further, in the Case of Klass and Others,167 the European
Court construed Article 13 as requiring that signatory states provide
redress before a national authority to any individual who claimed
his or her Convention rights had been violated. As noted above,
forcing individuals to litigate for extensive periods of time in non-
domestic forums offers a remedy that is neither effective nor national
to those that allege violations of their Convention rights.
Once a country has enacted the Convention into its domestic
law, each sector of that nation's government would have the ability
to extend the protections of the Convention to individuals. Individu-
als seeking redress would be able to pursue domestic remedies in
their own courts. This argument gains support from the fact that a
major concern behind the Convention was the protection of individ-
Thus, if a state had not incorporated the Convention into its domestic law (thereby deny-
ing individuals the ability to challenge Convention violations before domestic tribunals),
and had not declared that individuals had a right to petition the Commission, a state
might effectively foreclose its citizens from enforcing their Convention rights against it.
165. Sorensen, supra note 151, at 18. Sorensen claims that none of the statements in
Articles I or 13 are necessarily incompatible with a system which allows signatories to
implement the Convention as they see fit. But see supra note 152.
166. Note that it is well established that the internal law of a state can not provide an
excuse for ignoring international obligations. For instance, Article 27 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 107, states: "A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to peform a treaty." Id
167. See supra note 164 and accompanying text for a discussion of Klass.
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ual rights against infractions by state governments. 168 Incorporation
would encourage complainants to exhaust their local remedies
before resorting to the Commission and the Court, thereby promot-
ing other Convention goals.169 Finally, the language of Articles 1
and 13, the status of Article 13 as an independent right, and the com-
munity-oriented nature of Convention obligations also lend support
to this solution.
The Court's decision not to answer the Article 13 question in
Young, James, and Webster may have been the product of astute
political judgment. Given the controversy that has surrounded the
problem of the relationship of the Convention to domestic law, the
Court may have assumed that the issue is better left to the signatory
states. Nonetheless, Young, James, and Webster did present this
issue, and, as demonstrated, little short of the implementation of the
Convention in domestic law will guarantee new employees the right
not to join a union. Thus, the failure of the Court to find a violation
of Article 13 in the Case of Young, James, and Webster is particularly
unsatisfactory.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The failure of the Court to resolve the issues of whether Article
11 includes a right not to associate, or whether the United Kingdom
was in violation of Article 11, left numerous questions open to fur-
ther debate. For the moment the Employment Act, 1980, has miti-
gated the problem of compulsory union membership in the United
Kingdom, by providing that in some circumstances an employee
need not join a union. Given the history of British legislation deal-
ing with unfair dismissals and closed shop agreements, however, the
Court's lack of guidance on the Article 11 question is disap-
pointing.170 More importantly, the failure of the Court to address
the Article 13 question leaves a significant gap in the law; this failure
is especially disappointing because Young, James, and Webster
presented the most striking Article 13 problem-a direct conflict
between domestic legislation and the Convention. This Note
168. JACOBS, sufpra note 11, at 3.
169. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
170. The decision in Young, James, and Webster, however, may provide impetus for
the abolition of the closed shop in Britain. The judgment provided "powerful new
ammunition" to the Freedom Association, which had lent financial support to the appli-
cants' cause, and was expected to mount a campaign for tougher legislation following the
announcement of the judgment. The Times (London), Aug. 14, 1981 at 1, col. 2. Fur-
ther, an editorial in the London Times called for "new safeguards" and "more accounta-
bility" in closed shop legislation following the Court's decision. Id at 9, col. 1. The
editorial noted, however, that the closed shop is an established part of the British indus-
trial system and that the elimination of closed shops would create disorder. Id
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presents four suggestions for Convention reform which should be
considered in view of the questions left unanswered by the Court.
One solution to the Article 13 problem is for the Court to deter-
mine that Article 13 requires signatory states to ensure that their
domestic law is consistent with the Convention. Such a decision
might be based on the language of the specific articles, the length of
time an applicant must spend before the Commission and the Court
in order to vindicate Convention rights, the specificity of the rights
enumerated in the Convention, and the common intent of the con-
tracting parties to obligate themselves as a community to protect
human rights.171 One problem with this approach is that there
would be no way to enforce such a decision in any states other than
the ones that were involved in the proceeding before the Court,
because, under Article 53, only the parties in the particular case are
bound by the Court's decision; 172 the Court's decision has little or no
value as precedent. Hence, if the Court determined that Article 13
required the implementation of Convention rights into municipal
law, the decision would not be binding on all the signatory states. A
second problem with this approach is that if the Court begins to
enforce provisions in a manner in which the signatories did not
expect, such enforcement might deter further co-operative ventures
concerning Convention rights. The parties will be reluctant to bind
themselves if they believe that their future obligations might be con-
trary to their domestic law. In the final analysis, however, the Court
is likely to remain hesitant about issuing a decision that requires sig-
natory states to implement the provisions of the Convention into
their domestic law.
Another solution to the Article 13 question is for domestic
courts to continue to use the Convention to fill gaps in the existing
law, and to interpret ambiguous provisions in domestic law as con-
sistent with the articles of the Convention. This approach, however,
does not protect an individual vhen the legislation of a country is in
direct conflict with a provision of the Convention, as in Young,
James, and Webster. In such a case, the courts may be bound to
follow the domestic statute in question rather than the Convention.
The most popular solution among commentators is for the
United Kingdom, as well as the other signatories, to incorporate the
Convention into domestic law. 173 Such an enactment would estab-
171. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
172. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 14.
173. For a discussion by commentators who favor incorporation in the form of a Brit-
ish Bill of Rights see J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS 246 (1980); WAL-
LINGTON AND McBRIDE, supra note 105, at 43. Wallington and McBride favor adopting
the Convention as a British Bill of Rights, and set forth a draft bill which incorporates
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lish a basis for the enforcement of Convention rights before national
authorities, and would settle the confusion with regard to what Arti-
cle 13 requires of signatory states. This solution would also, for the
most part, remove the problem of conflicts between domestic law
and the Convention. Adopting the Convention into domestic law
might serve as a deterrent to the enactment of laws that were incon-
sistent with Convention rights. At the very least, courts in the signa-
tory states would have the opportunity to decide whether the laws
conflicted, and to mete out the appropriate remedy.
Ultimately, to ensure that the signatory states accept their Con-
vention responsibilities, the signatories should amend Article 13.
The amendment should specify that the language "an effective rem-
edy before a national authority" means that Convention rights are to
be enforceable as domestic law.174 Amending Article 13 would
avoid the potential difficulty of requiring states to comply with a
judicial order that interprets Article 13 in a manner in which those
states may never have intended to bind themselves. The amendment
would apply to all the signatories, hence, treatment of the Conven-
tion in the domestic law of all the countries involved would be con-
sistent. Furthermore, because the requirements of the Article then
would be clear, the amendment would avoid the imposition of
arguably unexpected Article 13 responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
The European Court's decision in the Young, James, and Web-
ster leaves unanswered several questions involving the interpretation
of Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention on Human Rights. With
respect to the problem of freedom of association and the closed shop,
the Court's decision indicates an unwillingness to construe Article 11
Convention rights, and establishes a Constitutional Court and remedies for Convention
violations. Id at 112. Jaconelli, however, concludes that the Convention would make a
poor Bill of Rights. He believes that the Convention adds little to British law, is drafted
more loosely than traditional British legislation, and might be construed as imposing a
maximum, rather than a minimum standard of responsibility for human rights. Duffy
notes that a 1976 House of Lords select Committee favored the adoption of the Conven-
tion as a Bill of Rights, but concludes that there is little support for incorporation of the
Convention. Duffy, supra note 127, at 591 n.37.
174. Such an amendment might be worded as follows:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority competent to adjudi-
cate claims of violations of Convention rights, consistent with the rights set forth
in this Convention, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.
The Convention has been amended several times in the past. The amendments are
found in the Protocols. See e.g., Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUR. CONV. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTs (1971).
CASE OF YOUNG, JAMES, AND WEBSTER
in such a way as to interfere with closed shop systems of the High
Contracting Parties. It provided relief to Young, James, and Web-
ster, and established that workers cannot be dismissed for failure to
join a union where the closed shop became effective after they had
begun work. The Court's analysis, however, leaves doubt about
what is integral to freedom of association. In Britain, the Employ-
ment Act, 1980, provides remedies for individuals who are dismissed
unfairly because of their failure to join a union. This legislation
temporarily alleviates some of the problems that arise in balancing
the validity of closed shop agreements with the individual's right to
freedom of association.
As for the problem of ensuring a right to an effective remedy,
Article 13 should be amended to reflect what the Parties' arguably
agreed to do, that is, incorporate the Convention into their domestic
laws. The European Convention is a unique agreement in that it
emphasizes community law and establishes an independent judiciary
to protect individual rights, traditionally a domestic matter. The
language of Article 13 places responsibility on the Contracting Par-
ties to ensure that Convention rights be available to individuals and
that remedies exist for violations. This responsibility is not fulfilled
unless the Convention has been incorporated into a country's domes-
tic law. It is time for the debate over the nature of this initial agree-
ment to end. Article 13 should be amended by the Parties so as to
mandate the incorporation of the Convention into domestic law.
Only then will individuals faced with a situation similar to that
presented in Young, James, and Webster be assured of the human
rights guaranteed by the Convention.
Catherine M. Shea
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